Our People’s War: Home Intelligence Reports and the Monitoring of British Morale, June 1941 – December 1944
Jeremy Crang, Bloomsbury, £20

DURING the second world war, the British government conducted a unique experiment in monitoring public opinion, carried out by Home Intelligence, a unit of the Ministry of Information.

The government needed to know what people were thinking in order to know how best to make them think the right way.

Regional intelligence officers created panels of regional “contacts” to gather the raw material from which they compiled their weekly reports on public opinion. These contacts were recruited, on a ratio of one to every 10,000, from among men and women who were “sensible” and “level-headed.”

This fascinating survey is the third book presenting these reports. The other two are Listening To Britain: Home Intelligence Reports On Britain’s Finest Hour, May to September 1940, edited by Paul Addison and Jeremy Crang, and The Spirit Of The Blitz: Home Intelligence And British Morale, September 1940 – June 1941, also edited by Addison and Crang.

The reports covered views of the various fronts in the war, the general state of confidence and reaction to news, industry, manpower, clothing, health, housing, transport, fuel, food, shopping difficulties, salvage, holidays, young people, mining, tax, pensions, fire wardens, strikes, the presentation of news, and rumours.

On the press, the report of October 1 1941 observed: “On all matters outside Britain it exercises considerable influence on opinion, as the public as a whole has no means of cross-checking by personal experience … On matters at Home, the press is a far less powerful formative agent. The public often makes up its mind on its own experiences before the press knows anything about it.” 

This report went on: “The British public as a whole shows a very high degree of common-sense. Given the relevant facts, it will listen to and accept explanations when it will not accept exhortations.” People have “a distrust of excessive enthusiasm, and … a suspicion of ‘newspaper talk’.”

Throughout this period, there was widespread support for the Soviet Union. The July 16-23 1941 report found “general agreement that ‘Russia is fighting, not only for her own existence, but also for ours.’ There is general approval of the Prime Minister’s ‘forthright declaration’ that our agreement with Russia is an alliance; and general condemnation of the failure to play her national anthem.”

In November 1941, “The great admiration felt by the public for Russia’s courage and endurance continues to grow with every week of her resistance.” In February 1942: “The gratitude and the admiration for the great fight of the Russians far exceeds the feeling for any other foreign country.”

In July 1942: “Opinion seems to be growing that ‘there remain sections of the Government who are still not willing to give the utmost aid to our ally’ and that they ‘are holding back in the hope that Russia and Germany will exhaust one another’… The idea that ‘Britain is leaving Russia and Germany to fight it out because the Government doesn’t want Russia to come out of the war too strong’ is reported in one form or another from eight regions; in one instance the US and British Governments are jointly accused.”

In March 1942, reports from several regions agreed that “Stalin is still the most applauded figure on cinema screens.” In December 1943, “Greater faith is placed in Stalin’s word than in any other statesman’s.”

In July 1944, “Widespread admiration and astonishment at the rapid advance of the Red Army continue. A great majority hope and expect that the Russians will be first in Berlin… ‘They will show no mercy to the Nazis, as we might’.”

Increasingly, people expressed a desire for a better life. In early 1942, “More and more people of all classes are said to be taking to ‘a kind of home-made socialism, which does not owe allegiance to any particular political party, but which expresses a resentment of the system which has given so much power to so few people’… The outstanding characteristics of this amorphous doctrine seem to be: (a) Its non-political character. (b) The impetus it has received from Russian successes. (c) A general agreement that ‘things are going to be different after the war.’ (d) A revulsion against ‘vested interests,’ ‘privilege’ and what is referred to as ‘the old gang’.”

The Beveridge report of December 1942 “has been welcomed with almost universal approval by ‘people of all shades of political opinion and by all sections of the community’ … Reports from three regions refer to ‘people being sceptical of talk about ‘the country can’t afford it’ — we can afford fourteen million pounds a day for war’.”

People wanted to focus on Britain and on their needs, not on the empire. Few supported the empire. On India, in March 1942, people “urge the immediate granting of Dominion status. There is said to be ‘growing impatience with the Government’s attitude’.” 

In March 1943, “Many, if not most people have their own opinions on how the Colonial Empire was acquired, the greatest measure of common agreement being on the proposition that it was acquired by conquest from native peoples… The future Colonial policy of this country should be… a thorough overhaul of the present policies… with a view to eliminating any exploitation of native labour and bringing vested interests under control.”