What has often been ignored or under-reported in discussions on French neo-colonialism in Africa is the strategic value of France’s close ties with its ex-colonies and why France goes to great lengths to defend those ties. The strategic objective of those economic, military and cultural ties is to embed French power in Africa and signal to the world that it is still a great power.

In terms of economic importance, Nigeria offers more opportunities to France than its Francophone West African countries, whose total wealth (or GDP) is much less than Nigeria’s. This is why Nigeria is France’s largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa. However, from a strategic point of view, France cannot pivot to Nigeria in order to enhance its power in the world system. It faces far stronger competitors in that country than in Francophone West Africa, and it can’t craft in Nigeria the kinds of neo-colonial relations it has established in Francophone Africa.

To understand the logic behind France’s neo-colonial designs in Africa, one has to turn the searchlight on France’s declining status in the world system and its long-running obsession with great power status. Between the 17th and 19th centuries, France was the preeminent power in Europe. This made French the language of the educated classes, royal courts and diplomacy. Indeed, French power reached its peak in the late 18th and early 19th centuries (roughly 1794-1815), when, under Napoleon, it controlled much of Northern Europe. French power began to decline in the 19th century with Napoleon’s defeat in 1815 and the humiliating defeat by Germany under Bismarck in 1870.

But more importantly for our analysis was Nazi Germany’s comprehensive defeat of France in the Second World War when the French army spectacularly collapsed without putting up a fight and allowed Hitler to set up a puppet regime in Vichy to govern France. Charles De Gaulle did establish a resistance government in exile—first in London and later in Algiers—and joined the Allied Powers to reclaim France and defeat Germany. But the collapse of France shocked the Allied Powers. France was not invited to the talks that led to the creation of the United Nations.

In the eyes of the US, Britain, the Soviet Union and China – the four countries that participated in the deliberations—France had lost its status as a great power since it was occupied by Germany. It didn’t deserve, therefore, to be at the talks. However, Winston Churchill convinced the US president, Franklin Roosevelt, to offer France a seat on the proposed Security Council of the UN on the strength of its historic status as a great power and its big global empire, much of it in Africa.

De Gaulle and the French elite felt deeply hurt by France’s decline and treatment by the victorious great powers. For much of his rule, De Gaulle was obsessed with restoring France as a great power in the comity of nations. He loathed the special relationship between the UK and the US and held on steadfastly to France’s colonies or devised neo-colonial arrangements with them to keep them in France’s orbit.

He also worked hard to rebuild French power within Europe by partnering with Germany to create the European Economic Community (present-day European Union), which he felt could enhance French power and serve as a counterweight to US power and the US-UK special relationship. He twice vetoed Britain’s attempt to join the EEC (1963 and 1967) on the grounds that the UK was not European enough; pulled France out of the military wing of NATO in 1966; developed France’s own nuclear deterrence; and, fearing a collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system, which was based on a gold-dollar fixed rate of exchange, tried to protect France’s dollar reserves and undermine the dollar’s role as a global currency, when, between 1963 and 1966, France converted many of its dollar holdings into gold.

According to Jan Nieuwenhuijs, 44 boat trips and 129 flights were made to transport 3,313 tons of gold reserves from the US to France. Despite these initiatives, France couldn’t become the hegemon in the EEC because Germany’s economy was bigger and more productive than France’s, and the EEC couldn’t displace or challenge US global hegemony.

The inevitability of conflict or rivalry between France and Nigeria

The last two sections laid the groundwork for understanding how Nigeria and France perceive themselves as great powers. Nigeria’s power resources are much smaller than France’s. Nigeria doesn’t, therefore, aspire to be a global power. But given the size of its population and economy vis-à-vis other African countries, it clearly aspires to be and sees itself as, a regional power in West Africa and a top-rank power in wider Africa, where it is challenged by South Africa and, to some extent, Egypt.

Nigeria’s strategic policy in the West African region can be described as expansionist. Even though it accounts for half of the population and wealth of the region, its influence in territorial terms tends to be limited to less than 10% of the region’s land mass. It has to expand its territorial reach if its claim to regional leadership is to be taken seriously.

It is important to state that this expansionist policy is not based on aggression or territorial claims. It’s pursued instead through the medium of regional integration in ECOWAS. As the biggest economy in the region, faster regional integration expands Nigeria’s economic and political influence within the Francophone states. Nigeria has supplemented the ECOWAS integration approach with bilateral assistance, such as the supply of electricity to Niger and oil price discounts to a number of countries during crises.

As we’ve seen, because of its history as a great European power, France aspires to, and perceives itself as, a global power. However, France’s global power status depends on its ability to project power globally. Its ex-colonies, most of which are in Africa, play a crucial role in helping it to project that power. Three-fifths of France’s ex-colonies in Africa are located in West Africa.

West Africa, thus, constitutes an important region for France in projecting its image as a global power. This means that France seeks to be both a global power and a regional power in West Africa. Success in the latter feeds its ambitions in the former. However, it has to contend with Nigeria, which is much bigger in population and economic terms than all the nine Francophone West African countries combined and has the added advantage of geographical propinquity that France lacks.

 

Bangura wrote from Nyon, Switzerland Bangura.ym@gmail.com

 

To be continued