IT APPEARS that the Biden administration, shortly before its departure, has instructed an escalation of tensions in the Baltic Sea with the potential for direct military confrontation with Russia.

Over the past years, the behaviour of European states suggests that all such action was directed by Washington. What is currently being orchestrated in the Baltic Sea can only be described as irrational and therefore highly dangerous.

Let us summarise what is happening. Under the pretext that the EU has the authority to impose sanctions on deliveries of Russian oil and gas that do not even enter the territorial waters of EU member states but merely pass through international shipping lanes, ordinary oil tankers from various owners and origins are labelled as a “shadow fleet.”

This artificial classification wants to make the lay public believe that Nato has the right to stop, inspect, or even block these vessels at will.

From a maritime law perspective however, the situation is straightforward and, unsurprisingly, entirely different from what Nato representatives and Western media suggest.

There is no legal basis for intercepting ships on international shipping routes unless there is a reasonable suspicion of involvement in the slave trade or piracy.

Blockading shipping lanes or seizing ships constitutes an act of war. The legal distinction between piracy and an act of war lies not in the act itself but in the actor, with piracy being non-state sponsored.

If a state performs any act akin to those performed by pirates, such as unlawfully taking control of a ship, then it is considered an act of war between the states involved.

Recently, the EU Commission in Brussels published a new sanctions list targeting ships it deems part of the Russian “shadow fleet.”

One reason cited is that these ships are not “properly” insured, meaning not by Western insurers. Interestingly, a significant number of these ships are not “shadow” but owned by the state-run Russian company SCF (known as Sovcomflot, which used to be the Soviet Merchant Fleet).

For state-operated ships, there is no requirement (!) for commercial insurance since the state can cover any damages.

Insurance requirements are meant to ensure compensation in cases where the damage causer might not have the financial capacity to do so.

Another pretext for the EU/Nato mobilisation against the Russian “shadow fleet” involves the recurring stories of alleged sabotage on cables in the Baltic Sea, with Russia supposedly being responsible.

Interestingly, all these disruptions occurred after Nato established its new Baltic Sea Command in Rostock, Germany, in October. It seems as if Russian saboteurs were waiting for Nato to get its military structures in the Baltic Sea in order before striking.

One might think ill of such timing, especially considering Nato’s military exercises simulating landings in St Petersburg and Kronstadt.

Finnish Marines load their gear into a Swedish CB90-class fast assault craft during Nato Steadfast Defender 24 maneuvers in March 2024. Credit: US Navy/CC

Last summer, Estonia and Finland loudly expressed their fantasies of sealing off the Baltic Sea to the Russian navy, an unrealistic prospect. However, this does not stop Nato representatives from entertaining such grandiose and self-aggrandising thoughts.

What is currently being prepared under the guise of the “fight against the shadow fleet and sabotage” is effectively a blockade of civilian shipping, possibly in the hope that this can be done without fearing a direct Russian response, as long as the ships are not Russian-owned or flagged.

Between December 2-15, Nato conducted an exercise named Blitz (Lightning) which included practising a blockade in the Gulf of Finland.

Future exercises are planned to include training for amphibious operations in Kronstadt and St Petersburg and attacks on the commercial port in Ust-Luga, near the Estonian border, where a significant number of ships on the EU sanctions lists are beginning their voyages to India and China.

There’s another aspect making these Western endeavours even more dangerous than they appear at first glance. Geographically, Russia is vulnerable in two places: Kaliningrad and St Petersburg, while the latter is economically far more significant.

Moreover, there’s the historical trauma of the Siege of Leningrad in WWII, where Finnish troops fought alongside German Nazis, making any threat to St Petersburg a serious matter for Russia, a fact well-known in Nato and EU circles.

The EU/Nato governments think that they only have until January 20 to provoke a Russian counterstrike in the Baltic Sea, so that they can scream foul play and cry about this “unprovoked aggression” from the “malevolent Russians” against innocent Nato/EU warships, which might have detained Russian oil tankers or conducted harmless military landing operations near St Petersburg.

The events of recent weeks in the Baltic region represent disturbing developments with too many unpredictable and irrational actors, including the “mad Baltics” from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The very real risk posed by these provocations, which are justified in Germany also with the narrative of “combating the shadow fleet” or “protecting against Russian sabotage,” should not be underestimated.

The “colour revolution” in Georgia has failed, as did the attempted coup and planned war in South Korea, but there’s no guarantee that the criminal EU/Nato plans in the Baltic Sea will meet the same fate.

The irrational hatred towards Russia within Western elites is exemplified by the recent sinking of the Russian cargo ship Ursa Major in the western Mediterranean, likely due to a terrorist attack from outside as evidenced by the inward-bent holes in the hull.

The ship sank quickly, but 14 crew members managed to escape in a lifeboat. However, the Norwegian vessel Oslo Carrier 3 refused to rescue these Russian sailors, citing some sort of prohibition after identifying them as Russian.

“After the lifeboat approached the ship, the Norwegian vessel refused to take aboard the crew of the Ursa Major, citing a kind of ban,” RIA Novosti quoted from the press service of the Russian shipping company Oboronlogistics.

Ultimately, the 14 crew members of the Russian dry cargo ship were rescued by Spanish sailors from the Salvamar Drago and brought to the port of Cartagena. Two Russian sailors are still missing.

This appalling behaviour by the crew of the Norwegian ship was almost entirely ignored by Western, self-proclaimed quality media.

There was no outcry from the otherwise “full of compassion” do-gooders in the media and politics. Instead, this incident shows how much the vaunted Western “civil society” has been brutalised under the influence of the vitriolic, anti-Russian hate campaign.

This dangerous propaganda tsunami attacks us relentlessly 24/7, and affects all aspects of life in a way, only known from totalitarian regimes. It starts with “evil Russian classical music” and “evil Russian literature” to end with “evil Russian sailors” being left to their fate in a small lifeboat in stormy seas, because? Yes, because they are Russian.

Rainer Rupp is a German journalist and former officer for the East German intelligence service and Nato official.